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U.S. COMMITTEE for REFUGEES

Refugee Law Is Not Immigration Law
James C. Hathaway, Professor of Law and Director of the Program in Refugee and Asylum Law at the University of Michigan, argues that the failure of
Australia and other actors to agree on responsibility for examining asylum
claims of boat refugees had less to do with gaps in international refugee law
than with lack of consensus about responsibility sharing obligations.

by James C. Hathaway
The spectacle of the governments of Australia, Indonesia, and Norway playing pass the parcel with 400
refugees, most of them Afghans, is not an edifying
one... Yet the issues of responsibility, over which the
three governments are arguing, are important ones
which, left unsettled in this and other cases, could
only worsen the prospects for all refugees in the longer
run. For the truth is that when what agreement has
been painfully achieved between nations on how to
deal with refugees breaks down, the natural reaction
is to erect even higher barriers than already exist.1

I

n the late days of August 2001, an extraordinary
saga was played out in the Indian Ocean between
Indonesia and Australia.2 A routine surveillance flight
by Australia’s Coastwatch on August 25 detected a 60-foot
(20-m) wooden boat in distress northwest of Australia’s
Christmas Island territory. Because the vessel was within
the Indonesian search and rescue zone, Australia alerted
officials in Jakarta to the situation. The next day, another
Coastwatch flight observed the fishing boat still in trouble,
this time with the letters “SOS” marked on the roof of the
craft’s cabin. Australian authorities decided to take matters
into their own hands, and broadcast a call to merchant ships
in the vicinity to render assistance to the sinking boat and
the 80 persons believed to be onboard. A nearby Singaporebound container ship of Norwegian registry, the MV Tampa,
responded to the call. Arriving onsite at the incapacitated
KM Palapa 1, the Tampa’s master, Captain Arne Rinnan, disThe author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Aimee Mangan
of the University of Michigan Law Library Reference Department.
The comments on an earlier draft by Dr. Mary Crock of the University of Sydney are also gratefully acknowledged.
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covered that there were in fact five times as many passengers on the vessel as he had been told—some 433 persons,
mostly from Afghanistan, but also smaller numbers from
Iraq, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. All were rescued by the crew
of the Tampa. Captain Rinnan then inquired of the Australian authorities where the rescuees should be taken. The
Coastwatch responded that it did not know.
Left to his own devices, the captain initially decided that because the Palapa had embarked from Indonesia, he would take the rescuees back to the Indonesian port of
Merak. But after five men threatened to jump overboard if
returned to Indonesia, he changed course toward Australia’s
Christmas Island, the nearest harbor. As the Tampa approached
Christmas Island, however, it was instructed by Australian officials to turn back toward Indonesia. Fearful of exposing his
crew and the rescuees to the dangers of a severely overloaded
ship on the open ocean, Captain Rinnan disobeyed the Australian order and instead held his position some 13.5 nautical
miles from the shore of Christmas Island—just outside
Australia’s territorial seas.
The Australian government was adamant that the
ship could proceed no further. Of the view that the rescuees
were properly the responsibility of either Norway, the
Tampa’s flag state, or of Indonesia, the Palapa’s place of registry, Australia threatened the Tampa with massive fines were
it to approach Christmas Island. The government then ordered the closure of Flying Fish Cove, the port of Christmas
Island. The harbor master signed an order prohibiting all boat
movements into and out of the cove, and erected barriers at
the end of the jetty. Captain Rinnan’s urgent pleas to send a
boat from shore to collect the sickest people were ignored.
Two days later, Captain Rinnan, fearing imminent
deaths onboard, took the Tampa into Australian territorial
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waters, stopping four nautical miles from the shores of
Christmas Island. Within two hours, 45 soldiers from the
Australian Special Armed Services boarded the ship. While
the soldiers’ purpose was ostensibly to provide medical assistance to the rescuees and to ensure the security of the
ship’s crew, the Special Armed Services troops also relieved
Captain Rinnan of control of the Tampa. The next day, the
Norwegian ambassador was allowed to visit the Tampa. The
rescuees made clear to him that they were seeking recognition of their refugee status, explicitly invoking their right to
be protected under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention.

The Responses
In response to the standoff near Christmas Island, two legally absolutist strategies were advanced on the Australian
mainland. On August 29, the same day that Australian
troops took control of the Tampa, the Australian govern-

ment tabled the Border Protection Bill 2001. Passed in less
than one hour by the House of Representatives, this bill
purported retrospectively to authorize the use of “reasonable force” against any ship just inside the Australian territorial sea to force that ship outside the territorial sea. Australian officers were given “absolute discretion” to implement the law. Critically, the bill provided that no person
onboard a ship subject to removal would have any remedy
against Australia, and moreover that no such person could
seek recognition of his or her refugee status. This bill—
which was to have operated “in spite of any other law”—
was, however, defeated in the Australian Senate in the early
hours of the next morning.3
A no-less-determined legal strategy was launched
by refugee advocates on August 31. On the basis of the alleged unlawfulness of the detention by Australia of the asylum seekers aboard the Tampa, the Federal Court of Australia was asked to issue writs of habeas corpus and mandamus
to require the government to bring the rescuees to Austra-

An unidentified Afghan man leans against the chain-link fence of a refugee camp after arriving with other
asylum seekers on the island of Nauru in September 2001. Some 500 refugees were rescued from sinking
boats north of Australia. Photo: AP/R. Rycroft
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had been rescued from the Palapa were transferred from
the Tampa to the HMAS Manoora, an Australian amphibious troop ship with extensive medical facilities onboard.
The original plan was to sail to Port Moresby in Papua
New Guinea, from whence about one-third of the asylum seekers (primarily family groups) would be flown
to New Zealand, which had agreed to allow all persons
determined by the New Zealand government to be genuine refugees to remain in its territory. The remaining
two-thirds of the refugee claimants would be taken to
the tiny and impoverished island nation of Nauru, where
they would be temporarily admitted in exchange for a
payment of about $7 million (13 million Australian dollars) worth of fuel, about $1.6 million (3 million Australian dollars) for new generators, the
cancellation of about $540,000 (1
million Australian dollars) worth
of hospital bills run up by
Nauruans in Australia, refurbishment of the island’s sports oval,
and the provision of sporting and
educational scholarships for
Nauruans to come to Australia. In
Nauru, the asylum seekers would
be housed in a makeshift camp
under the guard of a private Australian security firm while their
claims were assessed by the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). Those found to be
entitled to protection would be
admitted to Australia or resettled
to other countries, including
Norway, Sweden, and Canada.
While the Full Federal
Court of Australia was deliberating whether to reverse Justice
North’s original order, the Manoora
was already carrying the asylum
seekers away from Australia. Instead of proceeding to Papua New
Guinea as originally planned, the
Manoora sailed directly to Nauru,
where it arrived on September
18—the very day on which the Full
Federal Court issued its decision
to vacate the writ of habeas corpus.
In addition to the refugee claimants rescued on August 26, the
Manoora carried an additional 237
(largely Iraqi) asylum seekers
taken from another Indonesian
A young Iraqi asylum seeker in Bogor, Indonesia weeping after more than
fishing boat, the Aceng, which
350 persons, mostly Iraqis and Afghans, drowned off the Indonesian coast
was intercepted before reaching
when their boat sank en route to Australia, August 2001. Photo: AP
Australian territory.

lia where they would be entitled to enter that country’s refugee determination system. The applicants initially prevailed
before Justice North, who issued a writ of habeas corpus on
September 11, requiring all the asylum seekers to be brought
to the Australian mainland. A week later, however, a majority of the Full Federal Court reversed his order, affirming the prerogative power of the Australian government
to act outside the scope of its own immigration laws
where necessary to prevent the unauthorized entry of
non-citizens.
Even as these court proceedings were unfolding,
the Australian government proceeded to negotiate an interstate arrangement whereby the asylum seekers would be
taken to other countries. On September 3, all those who
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How Should the Situation Have Been Resolved
under International Refugee Law?
In my view, there is no basis in international refugee law to
justify the Australian government’s efforts mechanistically
to avoid responsibility by forcing the refugee claimants away
from its territorial waters, whether by the issuance of orders to Captain Rinnan or by the effort to enact bluntly
exclusionary legislation. But neither is there a basis in international refugee law for the assertion of refugee advocates that those rescued had a right to come to the Australian mainland in order to enter that country’s asylum system. Both these positions are unduly absolutist, and fail to
respect the careful compromise between the duty of protection and the continued sovereignty of states that is at
the core of the Refugee Convention.
The point of departure for legal analysis of this saga
is the Refugee Convention’s duty of nonrefoulement.4 This
duty not to return refugees directly or indirectly to the risk
of being persecuted inheres prior to the formal verification
of refugee status, and continues until and unless those who
claim to be refugees are fairly and finally determined not
so to qualify. As a simple matter of logic, this must be so.
Otherwise, it would be open to a state party to avoid its freely
assumed duties under the Refugee Convention by the simple
expedient of refusing ever to inquire whether an individual
seeking to invoke treaty rights qualifies as a refugee or not.
It is, of course, true that the rights set by the Refugee Convention are those only of genuine Convention refugees, not of every person who claims to be a refugee. But
because it is one’s de facto circumstances, not the official
validation of those circumstances, that gives rise to Convention refugee status,5 genuine refugees could clearly be
irreparably disadvantaged by the withholding of protection
against refoulement pending status assessment. Unless status assessment is virtually immediate, the adjudicating state
may therefore be unable to meet its duty to implement the
Refugee Convention in good faith unless it grants at least
the most basic Convention rights to refugees on a strictly
provisional basis.
Not only does the right to protection against refoulement inhere before status determination, but it applies
as soon as a refugee comes under the de jure or de facto
jurisdiction of a state party. In contrast to those rights which
are available only to refugees who are physically present
inside a state’s territory, the Refugee Convention grants Article 33 protection to “refugees” without any qualification
based on level of attachment to the asylum state.6 This
approach to refugee law coincides neatly with the more
general view that there is no principled reason to release
states which act extraterritorially from legal obligations
that would otherwise circumscribe the scope of their authority. According to international human rights expert
Theodor Meron,

In view of the purposes and objects of human
rights treaties, there is no a priori reason to
limit a state’s obligation to respect human
rights to its national territory. Where agents
of the state, whether military or civilian, exercise power and authority (jurisdiction, or
de facto jurisdiction) over persons outside
national territory, the presumption should be
that the state’s obligations to respect the pertinent human rights continues. That presumption could be rebutted only when the
nature and content of a particular right or
treaty language suggest otherwise.7
Finally, the substance of the duty of nonrefoulement
proscribes a pushing away from state territory, just as much
as an ejection from that territory after entry. As the American representative to the committee which drafted Art. 33
clearly observed,
Whether it was a question of closing the frontier to a refugee who asked admittance, or of
turning him back after he had crossed the
frontier, or even of expelling him after he had
been admitted to residence in the territory,
the problem was more or less the same. Whatever the case might be, whether or not the
refugee was in a regular position, he must
not be turned back to a country where his life
or freedom could be threatened.8
Indeed, the Belgian co-sponsor of the adopted text
emphasized that the duty had been expanded to an undertaking “not to expel or in any way [return] refugees...”9 precisely to ensure that it was understood that the article “...
referred to various methods by which refugees could be
expelled, refused admittance or removed.”10
Because of the comprehensive and consequenceoriented nature of the duty of nonrefoulement, both Norway
and Australia were under legal obligations to protect the
rescuees, duties that neither state appears fully to have recognized. Specifically, when Captain Rinnan took the refugees aboard the Tampa, the rescuees clearly were under the
jurisdiction of the ship’s flag state, Norway. In what may seem
a cruel irony, the minimum condition for the imposition on
Norway of the duty to respect the principle of nonrefoulement—
that is, jurisdiction—was satisfied. As soon as the Tampa’s
master could reasonably have become aware that his involuntary passengers were in flight from the risk of being persecuted, Norway’s obligations under refugee law were engaged.11
And even though Australia seems to have believed
that ordering Captain Rinnan not to enter its territorial sea—
which forced him to remain 13.5 nautical miles offshore
for two days—somehow insulated Australia from responsibility to protect the refugees, this may not have been so. A
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and refugee-specific restrictions on freedom of movement
sound case can be made that even though at this point the
must come to an end.12 This critical international legal
Tampa was still outside Australian territorial waters, primary
limitation on the right of states to detain refugees appears
legal responsibility to protect the refugees onboard nonenot even to have been considered in adjudicating the aptheless passed from Norway to Australia. At 13.5 miles off
plication for habeas corpus in the Federal Court.
the coast of Christmas Island, the Tampa was inside
However, the legality of Australia’s decision to force
Australia’s self-declared “contiguous zone.”
the refugees to leave its territorial sea aboard the Manoora,
Having asserted the international right to enforce
rather than admitting them to its refugee status determinaits immigration laws within this zone extending 24 miles
tion system, turns on a more subtle question. This is befrom its coastline, Australia’s authority to exercise jurisdiccause no refugee has the right to be granted “asylum,” untion should logically be understood to be subject to its genderstood in the sense of access to a pereral international legal obligations, inmanent or durable status in the state
cluding those under the Refugee Conto which his or her protection request
vention. While no refugee within the
is addressed. Until and unless a refucontiguous zone is “inside” Australia
adly, the internagee meets the requirements for protec(which would give rise to additional ention against expulsion under Art. 32—
titlements under international refugee
tional community
namely, that he or she is “lawfully in
law), jurisdiction alone is, for reasons
[the state party’s] territory” —the govpreviously discussed, sufficient to enseems determined to
erning provisions are Arts. 31 and 33
gage the duty of nonrefoulement. Thus,
of the Refugee Convention. Under the
the determined effort to keep the Tampa
reinvent the wheel
combination of these provisions, a state
outside Australian territorial waters,
each time a major
party is not precluded from expelling a
while perhaps important to avoid enrefugee claimant from its territory durgaging a broader range of Australian dorefugee crisis
ing the earliest phases of refugee recepmestic legal obligations, should in printion. It is only barred from doing so
ciple be deemed insufficient to escape
emerges, resorting to
mechanistically, or without scrupulous
international legal responsibility.
regard for the simultaneously appliThe issue of the international
ad hoc arrangements
cable duty of nonrefoulement.13
legal significance of entry into
This understanding of the
Australia’s contiguous zone, however,
which may or may not
Refugee Convention is not universally
became moot once the Tampa, fearing
shared. Bill Frelick of the U.S. Comthe serious deterioration of onboard
work in time to ensure
mittee for Refugees has recently made
conditions, entered Australia’s territorial
that refugees are not
an eloquent case that while the Refuseas, clearly a part of Australian terrigee Convention “does not... explicitly
tory for purposes of international law.
left unprotected
promise asylum,” an effective duty to
Under international law, the entry of the
assimilate persons determined to be
refugees into Australia’s territory exor worse.
refugees may nonetheless be asserted
panded their range of provisional enbased on “... the suasive power of nontitlements to include rights to religious
binding language” in Art. 34 of the
freedom, access to rationing and priRefugee Convention.14
mary educational systems, to receive identity documents,
But Frelick errs in suggesting that there is an “...
and to exemption from penalization for illegal entry.
unmistakable emphasis [in] the Convention... on a refugee’s
Perhaps most significantly, Australia was also at
willingness to return. The Convention... does not limit its
this point prohibited from imposing limits on the freedom
protection only to persons for whom objective conditions
of movement of the refugee claimants unless able to justify
make it impossible to return; instead, it specifically directs
the restrictions. Under Art. 31(2) of the Refugee Convenstates to recognize a refugee’s willingness or unwillingness
tion, authorities are allowed to detain refugees only for reato return based on his or her fear, as its guide.”15 This is not
sons generally agreed to be justified, including the need to
so: the notion of a “well-founded fear of being persecuted” is
satisfy themselves of an asylum seeker’s identity, or to denot an invitation to treat asylum seekers differently based upon
termine whether or not he or she presents a security risk to
their level of trepidation or subjective apprehension, but is
the asylum state. The refugee must, of course, submit to all
rather a direction to evaluate the objective soundness of their
necessary investigations of his or her claim to protection,
forward-looking apprehension of risk. This interpretation
and file whatever documentation or statements are reasonis not only consistent with the human rights context and
ably required to verify the claim to refugee status. But once
objects and purposes of the Refugee Convention itself,16
any such prerequisite obligations have been discharged, the
but allows Art. 1(A)(2) to be read in consonance with the
refugee’s presence has been regularized in the receiving state,

“S

”
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Convention’s clauses on cessation of refugee status due to
(objective) change of circumstances. Frelick’s analysis
pointedly ignores Arts. 1(C)(5) and 1(C)(6), which allow
states to withdraw refugee status on the basis of a purely
objective assessment of present risk without reference to
subjective apprehension or voluntariness.17
Assuming, then, that the Tampa refugees were
present, but not “lawfully present,” in Australian territory
by virtue of their entry into the territorial waters around
Christmas Island, refugee law posed no impediment to
Australia sending the rescuees from the Tampa onward to
New Zealand: there were clear guarantees made of admission to that country’s highly regarded status-determination
system, and no practice there that would suggest a risk of
refoulement. However, the sending of refugees to Nauru, a
non-state party with no history of refugee reception and
no government structures in place to oversee refugee protection, was less obviously a legally responsible act. It nonetheless appears in fact that the refugees sent to Nauru were
not thereby subjected by Australia to the risk of indirect
refoulement. Not only is it difficult to imagine how the
refugees would leave Nauru in practical terms, but the conditions there—while not ideal—are unlikely to be deemed
sufficiently egregious to have effectively forced away any
of the rescuees who in fact were to leave Nauru.18
The more vexing question is whether Australia
breached international law by effectively divesting the refugees of the ability to assert rights under the Convention
which they had by virtue of their former presence in areas
under the jurisdiction of (and subsequently, within the territory of) a state party to the Convention.
While they had acquired only a minimal set of
refugee rights in Australia, even those entitlements disappeared upon arrival in Nauru.19 Whatever protection they
enjoy de facto in Nauru is entirely vulnerable to the exercise of political discretion in a way that would not be true
in a state party to the Convention. But on balance, the
flexibility which inheres in states by virtue of the limited
applicability of Art. 32 of the Convention suggests that there
is no clear legal basis to contest the Australian reallocation
scheme. If the refugees were never lawfully present on Australian territory (including in its territorial waters), sending
them onward to a non-state party is within the bounds of the
Refugee Convention so long as there is no foreseeable risk of
direct or indirect refoulement. The gap between refugee law
and immigration law is thus perhaps all too clear.

What More General Lessons Should Be Learned?
The most basic lesson, of course, is that the existing legal
rules of refugee protection can, in most cases—assuming
both state accession and good faith application—ensure
that the most basic interests of refugees are met in a way
that is non-absolutist, yet comprehensive. So long as jurisdiction is understood to be a sufficient connection to

engage the duty of nonrefoulement, it is really only when refugees are located on the high seas that they may fall outside
the purview of the existing refugee law regime. And even
on the high seas, as analysis of this case shows, refugee law
responsibilities will follow automatically when actions are
taken in line with international legal duties to establish
search-and-rescue zones, and to respond to distress calls by
rescuing refugees at risk on the high seas.
My point is not that this is a fail-safe protection
system—refugees at risk do go undetected on the high seas,
and even on land, state participation in the Refugee Convention is less than universal. But the much more frustrating problem—precisely because it is so much more readily
remediable—is the absence of a shared understanding of
the ways in which existing rules play out in particular factual contexts, and of a concomitant determination by the
international supervisory authority, UNHCR, to bring those
rules to bear rather than simply encouraging states to “resolve the impasse” among themselves. Yet sadly, the international community seems determined to reinvent the
wheel each time a major refugee crisis emerges, resorting to
ad hoc arrangements which may or may not work in time to
ensure that refugees are not left unprotected or worse.
But even if we can reach a consensus that rules of
international refugee law do matter; even if we can agree on
the ways in which those rules are to be applied in practice;
and even if the UNHCR can be convinced that it must never
waver from the promotion of refugee law as the irreducible
minimum foundation for the resolution of protection challenges; we are still left with a fundamental dilemma. The
fact that a state party which has jurisdiction over a refugee
automatically owes that person respect for a core set of essential rights, including to protection against refoulement, is
a critical strength of refugee law: for the reasons described
above, it ensures that few refugees fall through the cracks of
the protection regime. Yet precisely because jurisdiction
alone is sufficient to assign full legal responsibility for the
refugee to a single state, the existing mechanisms of international protection appear absolutist in a way that is both
unprincipled and unsustainable.
The saga of the Tampa illustrates neatly some of
the unresolved inequities in the application of legal rules
to protect refugees. After all, Australia only became involved
because it had been willing to patrol an area of the high
seas which the state with true responsibility, Indonesia, had
negligently failed to oversee. Why should Australia be penalized because it took steps beyond its formal duties responsibly to issue a distress call which saved the lives of the
passengers of the Palapa? More generally, why should Australia, as one of the very few state parties to the Refugee
Convention in the region, be put in the position of needing
to pick up responsibilities more logically understood to be
regional, or indeed global, in nature? And even if Australia’s
greater wealth and stability are said to justify a special responsibility, was it really fair that Norway—an equally pros-
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perous and stable state, but much farther from most refugee-producing regions—was able to escape its duties by the
act of its captain taking his ship into Australian waters without that country’s authorization?
But on the other hand, why should Norway have
been saddled with sole responsibility for the welfare of the
refugees just because a ship flying its flag happened to be
nearest to the site of the tragedy? And what if the captain
of that ship had not been a person of sufficient courage to
take onboard many more drowning passengers than his
vessel could safely accommodate; or if the owners of the
ship had pressured the captain to exercise his discretion
negatively so as to avoid what became in fact very serious
delays in the delivery of its $20 million cargo?
Perhaps most fundamental of all, why should the
refugees have been forced to trek halfway around the world
in order to present their refugee claims to a country from
which they believed meaningful protection would be forthcoming? And once having found a way to enter Australian
jurisdiction, why should the refugees effectively lose their
acquired refugee rights by virtue of an arguably legal transfer of responsibility for them to the government of Nauru,
a state which is not a party to the Refugee Convention? But
on the other hand, should these refugees— who blackmailed Captain Rinnan by threats of suicide to head for
Australia—be entitled to benefit from their threats? And
why should this small group of Afghans be the subject of
special concern? At least on Nauru their basic safety is assured, in contrast to that of the many long-suffering Afghan refugees who could not afford to travel to Australia or
were otherwise unable to flee their own region.
The seeming arbitrariness of the way in which refugee law would have apportioned duties and granted rights
in the case of the Palapa refugees is in critical ways linked
to the complaints traditionally voiced by the countries of
South and Southeast Asia (among others) through which
the Afghans of the Palapa, as well as the Iraqis of the Aceng,
likely passed. Given their geographical position in a part
of the world exposed to seemingly endemic flows of large
numbers of genuine refugees, why would they sign on to
the Refugee Convention, thereby exposing themselves to
sole legal responsibility to honor the rights of whatever refugees show up at their frontiers? Why should these countries be expected to rely on vague promises of voluntary
assistance from UNHCR or other states—which usually arrives late, if at all? Without real guarantees of support,
would it not be irresponsible for them to assure their own
populations that acceding to the Refugee Convention will
not, in practice, result in the sorts of serious chaos faced by
other states (such as Tanzania, Democratic Republic of
Congo, and Pakistan) which attempted to play by the rules
of international refugee law?
Thus it is that refugee protection—in both the less
developed and in the developed worlds—is in serious
trouble, not because of any fundamental flaw in the actual
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rules of international law which in principle govern the
treatment of refugees, but because of the failure of the international community to commit itself to a clearly dependable and visibly fair system under which burdens and responsibilities are shared within the bounds of those legal
commitments. This is not a call for new rules, but rather
for new structures of implementation within which the rules
will be understood by states to be reconcilable to their most
basic interests. There are clear and workable proposals on
the table to achieve precisely these ends,20 but that is exactly
where they have remained.21 Ironically, much creative thinking has been devoted to learning the lessons from the experiences of sharing initiated in Southeast Asia during the crisis of
the boat people more than 20 years ago, fine-tuned in mechanisms later employed in Africa and Latin America.
If we fail to systematize a process of collectivized
protection, we invite criticism of refugee law itself, rather
than of its implementation mechanisms. Worse still, we
invite de facto withdrawal from refugee law. For example,
in the wake of the Palapa events, Australia has enacted several new pieces of legislation22 which inter alia purport to
excise Christmas Island and a number of other remote territories from Australia for refugee law purposes; radically
reduce access to the courts by refugees; and redefine by legislative fiat core portions of the supposedly non-derogable
international legal definition of a “refugee.” The risk of
failing to take principled action to stave off such defensive
measures, or at least clearly to de-legitimate the rhetoric of
unfairness which accompanies them, is thus all too real.
We simply cannot afford to persist in the usual pattern of
vague understandings of legal duties coupled with ad hocery
in its implementation.
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